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Chiropractor. Chiropractic. Upon hearing these words what comes to
mind? To those who have never been under chiropractic care, almost
assuredly the reaction to those words carries a negative connotation. Why is
it that such strong feelings exist about a subject that one has no experience
with, and where do these strong opinions originate?
Wilk v. American Medical Association' touches upon these very questions
and answers them to a degree. Dr. Chester Wilk, the main plaintiff in this
suit and a chiropractor practicing in Illinois, filed suit against the American
Medical Association (AMA), and others similarly situated for violation of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Wilks alleged that the AMA and other groups, as
well as individual actors, had conspired to contain or eliminate the
chiropractic profession. Wilk alleged that, as a result of these actions, the
This article is dedicated to the chiropractors that foiged ahead against the overwhelming power
of organized medicine and risked arrest and incarceration to bring a drug free alternative to the suffering.
This article is also dedicated to the countless chiropractors and their patients that lobbied and petitioned
legislatures in all 50 states to pass licensing laws legalizing Chiropractic. This article would have been
impossible without the guidance of Professors Jonathan Simon, John Gaubatz, Linda Keller, Attorney
John Rooney, and Sandra Riley. I would like to especially thank my wife, as well as Patti, Lavi, Ruvayn,
and Shaina for their support.
1 671 F. Supp. 1465 (N. D. 11. 1987).
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chiropractic profession and he personally suffered injury through the loss of
reputation and lost opportunity."
After lengthy legal wrangling that began in 1978, the court issued its final
opinion and order in 1990, fully 12 years later. Judge Getzendanner of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois Eastern
Division found that the AMA and its members (the majority of medical
doctors in the U.S.) participated in a conspiracy against chiropractors in
violation of the nation's anti-trust laws.
3
Judge Getzendanner found in the early 1960's that the AMA officially
decided to contain and eliminate Chiropractic as a profession by working,
both overtly and covertly.4 The judge found that the AMA partially
succeeded in this endeavor by making it unethical for medical physicians to
professionally associate with chiropractors, who they portrayed as
unscientific cultists. They further conspired to prevent access to hospitals,
use of diagnostic facilities and hospital medical staffs. They also prevented
medical doctors from teaching at chiropractic colleges or engaging in any
joint research.5
Conspiring to eliminate a profession is per se a violation of the Sherman
Act, yet the court allowed a patient care defense. The court afforded the
AMA an opportunity for an exception to the Sherman Act6 by way of the
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine. This doctrine provides constitutional rights to
lobby the government and permits courts to intercede in what is believed to
2 Id. (initiating permanent injunction order against AMA), available at
http://www.chirobase.org/08Lcgal/AT/ato4.html.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 3.
6 15 U.S.C.A. §5 1-2 (West Supp. 2002)
S1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be
illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy
hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding $ 10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person,
$ 350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
S 2. Monopolization; penalty
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $ 10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other
person, $ 350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court.
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be a public policy concern. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the
AMA failed in this defense because it was proven that other motives were
involved aside from alleged patient safety.7
The court further noted that an injunction was appropriate due to the
lingering effects of the illegal boycott and conspiracy. The court found that
these actions continue to influence the decision by medical doctors to
professionally associate with chiropractors (even though as part of the
settlement in three other cases involving chiropractors and the AMA, the
AMA changed its stance). The AMA now considers it ethical to
professionally associate with doctors of chiropractic, but has left it up to
personal decision-making.8
The court further declared that the tainted reputation of chiropractic,
which resulted from the boycott, had not been repaired and thus chiropractic
continues to suffer economic injury.' The court found that in spite of the
AMA's assurances of a discontinued boycott, or the newly formulated canon
minus the section preventing professional association, that the AMA has
never affirmatively acknowledged that there are and should be no collective
impediments to professional association and cooperation between DC's and
medical doctors, except as provided by law, and has consistently argued that
its conduct had not violated the antitrust laws.' ° The injunction, however,
addresses only prospective interference by the AMA with the right of a
physician, hospital, or other institution to make an individual decision on the
question of professional association with chiropractors.
This Article addresses the court's wholly inadequate injunction that does
nothing to rectify the pernicious, and pervasive poisoning of the chiropractic
profession by the AMA, or the multitude of medical providers and health-
care delivery decision makers in government and private sectors, where the
AMA's stinging barbed tentacles ultimately reach. Before discussing the
reasons why the injunction was inadequate and my proposed solution to this
inadequacy, it is important to understand the history of the AMA and how
pervasive its effect on society as a whole has become, in order to be able to
fully comprehend and grasp the remedy required by way of the federal and
7 WALTER I. WARDWELL, CHIROPRACTIC: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF A NEW PROFESSION
13 (1992). It is interesting to note that chiropractors, whose patient base involves patients that would
otherwise be cared for by neurologists, orthopedists, and neurosurgeons among others, pay considerably
less for malpractice coverage than the comparably mentioned MEDICAL DOCTOR's. From this it is
plain to see that actuarially chiropractors are safer than MEDICAL DOCTOR's in treating the same
conditions.
8 Permanent Injunction Order Against AMA, supra note 2, at 2.
9 Not to mention the economic and health injury to those that are persuaded to not seek
chiropractic care.
10 Permanent Injunction Order Against AMA, supra note 2, at 3.
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state courts, and the federal and state governments. Unfortunately, the
history discussed below was not properly addressed by the Wilk court, nor
by the injunction.
I. HISTORY
Paul Starr" did an exhaustive review of the healthcare system in the
United States and how the AMA became interwoven into its very fabric since
its inception in 1846, which was 49 years prior to the discovery of
Chiropractic. According to Paul Starr, the AMA was formed primarily by the
orthodox medical practitioners of the day, as opposed to those who were
known as non-orthodox practitioners. For the most part both trained in
medical schools. The orthodox, or regulars were at that time very
disorganized and ultra-competitive, and relied on the notions of strong
noxious cures, bloodletting, and surgery.
The non-orthodox were more inclined toward botanicals, herbs and
homeopathic remedies, with the homeopaths by far the largest group next to
the orthodox medical doctors. Their training in these other non-noxious
remedies came from outside the medical schools where they got their M.D.
degree. According to Starr, "monopoly was doubtless the intent of the AMA's
program" when conceived in 1846.12
The AMA in 1852 accused the homeopaths, who were medical doctors
that disavowed the orthodox views, ofwaging a war of radicalism against the
profession, primarily because the homeopaths chose to appeal directly to the
populace and were publicly vocal in their disfavor toward medicine's noxious
cures. 3 Therefore, the AMA banished the homeopaths and sought their
extinction by not working with them, as well as, excluding them from
hospitals, military service, and medical boards. 4
The AMA Code of Ethics at that time barred from membership those
doctors that subscribed "to an exclusive dogma.""5 The homeopaths dubbed
the orthodox medics "allopaths", insisting that they, also, had an exclusive
dogma, of cure by opposites, the reverse of the homeopathic dogma of cure
by similars. 6
Since the AMA could not seem to eliminate them and their popularity
grew the more the orthodox medics tried, they allowed homeopathy to be
PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982).
12 Id. at 91.
13 Id. at 98.
14 Id. at 98-99.
13 Id.
16 Id. at 100.
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taught in the medical schools to garner the lucrative referrals that associating
would bring, and gain an opportunity to influence them at the same time.
With this collaboration many homeopaths split into two camps, one of the
purists and the other the moderates." The more the regular medics accepted
these moderates, the less the homeopathic profession flourished until they
were essentially absorbed by orthodox medicine by the early 1900's. The
newly formed AMA's first victim of a concerted effort to eliminate a
competitor was accomplished with honey instead of vinegar
Between 1900 and 1905 the AMA revised itself and formed a National
House of Delegates with delegates chosen by state chapters that were in turn
fed by local chapters."8 This organization led to a camaraderie that was an
economic boon to its members and thus by the 1920's 60 percent of the
medical doctormedical doctors in the U.S. had become members. Thus, the
term "organized medicine," 19 was coined. The true reason for increased
membership aside from potential referrals (which were negligible) was due
to the explosion of medical malpractice claims.
The courts were to a great extent to blame for the growth of the AMA,
since it was the courts that formulated the requirement that medical doctors
would be judged by the local standard of the community in which they
practiced. To determine the local standard, a local medical doctor would be
required to testify as to the negligence of the accused doctor.2' Members of
the AMA would not testify against each other and thus AMA members
almost never lost a malpractice case. This also led to lower insurance
premiums for members.Y These were two extremely important member
benefits. To be a member was truly a great advantage and to be shunned by
the AMA was an economic death sentence,2
The AMA still wanted to further reduce competition, so it dedicated its
resources to controlling the educational process. Until the early 1900'sjust
about anyone could go to, or start a medical school. In order to practice
medicine one needed only a diploma from any diploma mill medical school
to get a license. There was no uniformity or accrediting agencies. With over
170 medical schools cranking out diplomas to anyone who could afford the
tuition fees, competition among doctors for patients was fierce. 4
17 Id. at 101. Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine, p. 101.
18 Id. at 109.
,9 Id. at 110.
0 Id. at 111.
21 Id. Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine, p. 111.
Id.
Id.
24 Id. at 112.
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The AMA needed to reduce the number of schools churning out doctors.
With fewer doctors, the pot of riches would increase dramatically. To
accomplish this, the AMA formed the Council on Medical Education in
1904 and proceeded to raise the standards by secretly rating the schools.2 5
The longer the training period and the higher the entry requirements, the
higher the rating the school would receive. With the AMA-controlled
schools raising the bar, many schools were forced to close due to the
competition to provide the required facilities in order to achieve a higher
rating, and entice the wealthier students. These students could afford the
higher tuition and stay in school for a longer period without earning a
living.2
6
To get the message out and eliminate the lower tier schools, the AMA
hired The Carnegie Foundation to do a public rating. The Carnegie
Foundation sent Abraham Flexner, to conduct the rating test. By the time
he was finished inspecting and rating the schools, the AMA was the premier
accrediting agency and all those schools that did not follow their guidelines
disappeared. As a result, competition was reduced again.
27
It is thus readily apparent that had the court, or the plaintiff done a little
more research, it would have been borne out that the AMA's pattern of
behavior is one it has carried out since its inception and then, as now, has
never been a question of patient safety, but rather economic and political
gain, in order to achieve total domination of the healthcare field and
healthcare dollar, whether their particular approach to healthcare (dogma)
was more beneficial, or not.
It is clear from the above history and the conflict between chiropractic
and organized medicine, much the same as the conflict between organized
medicine and the homeopaths, that the injunction issued in Wilks could not
go nearly far enough in rectifying the damage done by such a powerful lobby.
Metaphorically, the court rescued the captive, abused, and neglected child
from its tormenters and set them free to roam the streets. No provisions
were made to see that this abused child would not suffer the abuse of other
scavengers with the same astuteness of laying prey to the susceptible.
I[. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The problem we are faced with, however, is how to afford the
chiropractic profession protection while simultaneously allowing for the
constitutional freedom of speech of its antagonists. Must we protect their
2 Id. at 117.
26 Id.
- Id. at 118.
ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS
freedom of speech? Should we protect their freedom of speech? Is
Chiropractic a protected group? Is public health a compelling interest to
override the constitutional freedoms of speech of organized members?
These questions can best be answered by looking at the Supreme Court's
reasoning and decisions involving the First Amendment and proscribed
speech. One such case is R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, in which the
court held that the First Amendment did not permit the government to
impose special prohibitions on speakers who expressed views on disfavored
subjects. R.A. V., involved a St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime ordinance that
prohibited certain types of action or speech that would arouse anger, alarm,
or resentment in others "on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender." 29 The court determined that even if the expression reached by the
ordinance was "proscribable under the 'fighting words' doctrine, ... the
ordinance was facially unconstitutional because it prohibited otherwise
permitted speech solely on the basis of the speech" addressed and not the
content.
The slander and libel by medical practitioners toward Chiropractic and
chiropractors to friends, family, patients, the media, and colleagues might be
considered proscribable speech, and if so, then must not be shown to be
permitted speech if prohibited based solely on the subjects the speech
addresses in order to pass constitutional muster if enacted into law.
The court in its unanimous opinion, however, was greatly divided with
four concurrences. In the plurality opinion by Scalia, he states that "[t]he
First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech
• I., or even expressive conduct . . ., because of disapproval of the ideas
expressed. Content based regulations are presumptively invalid" (citations
omitted) .31
With an opening such as this, it appears that chiropractors would have
extreme difficulty in formulating legislation, or convincing the court of
extending the injunction toward private individuals.
However, the court goes on to say that "[flrom 1791 to the present,
however, our society .. .has permitted restrictions upon the content of
speech in a few limited areas, which are 'of such slight-social value as a step
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality.'o" 32
28 RAV. v City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
19 Id. at 380.
30 Id. at 381.
31 Id. at 382.
32 Id. at 383.
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The court has "recognized that the freedom of speech referred to by the
First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional
limitations," for example: obscenity, defamation, or fighting words.33 The
court further qualifies this by stating that "since the 1960's [they] have
narrowed the scope of the traditional categorical exceptions for defamation
... and for obscenity,.., but a limited categorical approach has remained an
important part of [their] First-Amendment jurisprudence. 34
In order for chiropractic to be protected from the anti competitive speech
characteristic of organized medicine, it must somehow fit into one of the
traditional categorical exceptions, most notably defamation.The court
explains "areas of speech can, consistently with the First-Amendment be
regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity,
defamation, etc.) .... 3- Using the courts reasoning below, legislation could
be drafted and possibly the Wilk injunction extended to private individuals,
not because of the content of the defamatory speech, but because the
defamatory speech is found to be violative of the Sherman Act prohibition
of illegal anti-competitive action that constitutes an illegal boycott.
Justice Scalia emphasizes that "[t]he proposition that a particular instance
of speech can be proscribable on the basis of one feature ... but not on the
basis of another ... is commonplace", and he goes on to say that the court
has "long held, for example, that non-verbal expressive activity can be banned
3136because of the action it entails, but not because of the idea it expresses ....
The court applies a test of the content discrimination that is proscribable
in where its basis consists of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue
is proscribable, and where no significant danger of idea or viewpoint
discrimination exists. In the case of chiropractic, the speech by organized
medical practitioners that defames and is in the tradition of the biased,
irrational behavior that triggered the violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
would be proscribed speech, but speech that entails scientific-based research
that simply explains whether a certain condition would not benefit from the
care of a chiropractor would be protected speech, as it would be relaying
scientifically-based information.37
The R.A. V. court reiterates that commercial speech that poses the risk of
fraud is one characteristic of commercial speech that does not merit the
protection of the First Amendment.3 The patient safety defense that was
33 Id.
34 See e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., at 383.
35 Id.
M Id. at 385.
37 Id. at 388.
M Id.
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found ineffectual by the Wilk court would find no protection when conveyed
to potential chiropractic patients or current patients, in that it would be a type
of commercial speech that carries the risk of fraud, in that historically such
speech has been in pursuit of an illegal boycott, and whose sole purpose has
been to destroy competition.The fact that R.A. V. was decided in 1992, and
after the Wilk injunction, is immaterial in that the cases drawn upon by the
R.A. V. court were decided long before then and as far back as 1791.
One need not go so far as to say that chiropractors due to longstanding
discrimination enjoy protection as would a suspect class, although an
argument could be made that chiropractic dogma as medical dogma could be
compared to that of a religious dogma and entitled to protection from the
majority, and that any government healthcare entities and laws that
discriminated against one dogma over another, might be a violation of the
Establishment Clause. Commercial speech alone and defamation works
adequately well to protect chiropractors from objectionable, fraudulent,
unlawful anti-competitive speech and behavior.For the Wilk court to
overlook a remedy for the lingering effect of the illegal boycott by the AMA
was a weak and ineffectual attempt to appear as if a remedy was
provided.Perhaps the court in Wilk was ill prepared, or at a loss for how to
enforce such a speech prohibition, or felt it better left to congress, but the
court certainly did not give congress direction to concern itself with this
blatant violation of federal law, seriously weakening a 'benefit of the doubt'
to the court argument. One need only go to the multitude of cases involving
desegregation to find the blueprint for the court to retain jurisdiction over
this injunction, as is, or in an ideal form.
In Daniels,39 the court found that post-trial discrimination or
"wrongdoing after final judgment requires a new complaint, unless it
amounts to contempt of court."' This case involved only a consent decree
that had expired and not an injunction such as in Wilk. The Wilk court could
have made provisions in the injunction that would make clear the fact that
future violations would be within the court's jurisdiction, instead of just
providing a shopping list of to-do items as it did. As the Daniels court
provided, '[a]ccused contemnors are not entitled tojury trials before judges
may enter remedial court orders ... ,41 This holding would not only apply
to the AMA but to all those named in the original suit that had made
settlement agreements, as well.
39 Daniels v. Pipe Fitters Ass'n, Local Union 597, 113 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 1997).
1) Id. at 688 (citing EEOC v. Enter. Ass'n Steamfitters, 542 F.2d 579, 590 (2nd Cir.1976);
Patterson v. Am. Tobacco, 535 F.2d 257, 269 (4th Cir. 1976).
41 Id. at 7.
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The way the Wilk court wrote its order made it appear that it would not
retainjurisdiction over future accusations of continued discrimination. The
Wilk injunction lacked the backbone needed to require that the AMA notjust
superficially lift the practice of non-association, but should have required the
AMA Code to deem it unethical to deny association and cooperation, for the
greater good of the patient and society. Allowing the AMA to make a fingers
crossed behind the back assertion that they will no longer practice deception
and treachery is to blame for the continued ill effects suffered by the
chiropractic profession at the hands of organized medicine, directly and, or
indirectly. The Wilk case should never have been closed. The court should
have maintained jurisdiction until all remnants of discrimination had been
substantially eradicated. Doiwell42 sought dissolution of a decree entered by
the court imposing a school desegregation plan. The District court granted
relief, with the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversing that decision. The
Tenth Circuit held that dissolution of the decree would require "nothing less
than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen
conditions ..... .3 The Supreme Court held that the Tenth Circuit's test
was too stringent when dealing with injunctions or by the... Fourteenth
Amendment and reversed.
Unitariness was one of the criteria for the lifting of the injunction in this
case. In the case of Wilk, unitary would apply to the AMA's lifting of barriers
to association, but would not achieve 'unitary status' by this alone. Unitary
status is achieved when "the vestiges of... prior discrimination [have been
eliminated] and has been adjudicated as such through the proper judicial
procedures."'
In Wilk, the court apparently applied the unitary doctrine to the AMA's
change in their Code of Ethics, and prematurely relinquished jurisdiction
when it should have maintained jurisdiction until unitary status could be
achieved. In the desegregation cases such as here, an injunction that allows
a school board to issue statements and rules of desegregation to remedy past
discriminatory behavior is qualified with a provision that such matters as
discrimination be left to the individuals schools to decide in their own best
interest whether to abide by those rules, would be laughable. Yet, this is
exactly the type injunction that the Wilk court provided and without any
continuing jurisdiction.The court in finally disposing of the matter said
"although an order can be binding as to the unitary character it is not enough
to terminate jurisdiction until the remedy has reached unitary status. a1 The
42 Bd. of Ed. of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
43 Id. at 240.
'A Id. at 245.
45 Id. at 246.
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court further reiterated in quoting Grant,4 "compliance alone cannot become
the basis for modifying or dissolving an injunction. 4 In Wilk, this precedent
should have served to put more backbone into the injunction, not less.
In furtherance of my proposition that the Wilk injunction was wholly
inadequate is the pronouncement that
"[flederal-court decrees most directly address and relate to the
constitutional violation itself. Because of this inherent limitation
upon the federal judicial authority, federal-court decrees exceed
approximate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition that
does not -violate the constitution or does not flow from such a
,,48violation....
The illegal boycott by the AMA was violative of the federal Sherman Anti -
Trust Act, 49 borne of preventing constitutional violations of interstate
46 U.S. v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953).
47 498 U.S. 237 at 246.
48 Id. at 247, quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977).
4) 15 U.S.C.A. § 1-3 (West Supp. 2002).
§1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be
illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy
hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person,
$350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
S 2. Monopolization; penalty
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other
person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court.
S 3. Trusts in Territories or District of Columbia illegal; combination a felony
Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce in any Territory of the United States or of
the District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such Territory and
another, or between any such Territory or Territories and
any State or States or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the District
of Columbia and any State or States or foreign nations,
is declared illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such
combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $ 10,000,000 if a
corporation, or, if any other person, $ 350,000, or by
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commerce. Thus, a stricter injunction against.the AMA and its cohorts
would be constitutionally required.
In W. T. Grant Co., "[the] court observed that a promise to comply with
the law on the part of the wrongdoer did not divest a district court of its
power to enjoin the wrongful conduct in which the defendant had previously
engaged." o Although the Wilk court did issue the injunction, it was
certainly not of effect for all wrongful conduct engaged in by the AMA and
at the least, it must be reiterated, the order required mention of a continued
jurisdiction in perpetuity. Proof that the discriminatory, anti competitive
effects of the AMA's illegal boycott continue to exist is readily evident today.
If the actors involved are not directly the AMA, then they are either
members, or entities and individuals that are directly influenced by such
linked individuals by way of medical school graduates of AMA accredited
schools, government influenced committees with such members included,
hospitals and staffs, insurance companies, health care organizations, and peer
reviewers, etc.
One example, of the very types of proscribable speech that my thesis is
intended to bring to light, comes from the University of Miami Richter
Library. I did a computer search of all titles available at all UM Schools
including the medical school, using the keyword "chiropractic." Only thirty-
two hits returned the word. All but five were reports on governmental
meetings. Noticeably absent was the Wilk Order and Injunction. Fourteen
years post Wilk sees no change of import here. "At your own Risk: The Case
Against Chiropractic,"-" was one of the five books, a vintage AMA boycott era
scare novel rife with blaring attacks on chiropractic. The prologue begins
with the heading. "[t]he Death of Linda Epping."52 This book, a Simon and
Shuster of New York publication, was no fringe publication.
The following is but a brief listing of the continued injury being suffered
by the chiropractic profession as a result of the AMA boycott. In 1985,
during the Wilk trials and after the AMA claimed it had changed its Code of
Ethics, a chiropractor entered into an agreement with a medical neurologist
to refer patients to each other and to share office space in each other's
practices. The neurologist had his office in a condominium office park. A
staff member at the local hospital with an office in the condo, as well as other
hospital staff members contacted the M.D. and requested that he terminate
this M.D.-D.C. relationship as "no good would come to him from
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court.
so 498 U.S. 237 at 248-49.
$I RALPH LEE SMITH, ATYOUR OWN RISK: THE CASE AGAINST CHIROPRACTIC (1969).
52 Id-
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associating with a chiropractor." 3 Shortly thereafter the condo association
sent a letter to the M.D. to cease and desist this relationship, or he would be
held in violation of the newly enacted anti-chiropractic condo association by-
laws and would be evicted. Shortly thereafter, the hospital suspended the
M.D.'s staff privileges after a period of heightened scrutiny of his cases and
other abusive and punitive behavior. The M.D. caved in and ceased his
association with the chiropractor.
Dr. Ernest Petrocco, a chiropractor, applied for staffprivileges at the local
hospital in 1994. He was denied staff privileges because the hospital by-laws
did not allow privileges to chiropractors."5 A chiropractor brought suit for
anti trust, claiming that the insurance company refused to provide coverage
for chiropractic services, as a method of retaining the endorsement of the
local medical society. The chiropractor sought a claim of conspiracy. (The
court explained that a conspiracy can be drawn from acts by a defendant in
contradiction to its economic interests.) 6 Although the case was one of
summary judgment in which the plaintiff survived the defendant's motion
to summarily dismiss, it illustrates how an insurance company would
conspire with medical societies to deny chiropractors reimbursement, even
where as here, it was in contradiction to the insurance companies economic
interest to do so.
Dr. John Cowan, a chiropractor, brought suit against an insurance
company for not providing non-emergency based chiropractic care in
accordance with state statute. The court found that the statute allowed for
limitations in benefits and thus considered the action by the insurance
company valid as it did provide for less than utter negation!57 In Louisiana,
a municipal Healthcare Trust Fund Board was sued by chiropractors for
singling out the primary treatment by chiropractors for a severe limitation in
their employee health benefit plan, in violation of the Insurance Equality
Statute. Unlike the Cowan case this court did not fall for the smoke and
mirrors de minimus reasoning. 8 In Virginia, chiropractors are currently
involved in a lawsuit against a Blue Cross subsidiary for anti-competitive and
discriminatory practices aimed at chiropractors where services are
53 Chinnici v. Central Dupage Hospital Assn., No. 89C07752, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8164 at
*1-5 (N.D. Ill.July 2, 1990).
Id.
55 Pctroccov. Dover General Hospital and Medical Center, 642 A2d 1016,1018 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1994).
% Johnson v. Blue Cross/ Blue Shield of New Mexico, 677 F. Supp. 1112 (N.M. 1987).
57 Cowan v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Mich'igan, 421 N.W. 2d. 243,244-45 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988).
58 Nosser v. Health Care Trust Fund Bd., 666 So. 2d 1272, 1273 - 75 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
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reimbursed at a lower scale if provided by a chiropractor, rather than if
provided by an M.D., or D.O., although the services are identical.'9
At Webring on the internet, is a subgroup called the Anti-Quackery Ring
with links to anti-chiropractic information services.6°The website
chirowatch.com is another website filled with chiropractic hate literature with
such titles as "Are you playing Chiro-roulette?" and "W/hat are the links between
chiropractic and scientology?"61Dr. Stephen Barrett, M.D., a longtime anti-
chiropractic advocate dating back to the AMA Committee on Quackery, is
still spewing his hatred with impunity at Quackwatch on the net, in four
languages no less.62
Chirobase lists itself as "A Skeptical Guide to Chiropractic History,
Theories and Current Practices." Also operated by Stephen Barrett, this site
includes the aide of a PhD., and a chiropractor.
63
In November of 2002, the state of Vermont, whose governor is an
M.D., by emergency rule will cease to provide chiropractic coverage under
Medicaid to those over 21 years of age. The savings to Medicaid would be
$43,000 for a nine-month period. According to the Secretary of the Agency
of Human Services, without the reduction "there exists an imminent peril
to public health, safety, or welfare."'
The irony in the budget cuts is that those patients who cannot afford
chiropractic will seek out a medical, or osteopathic doctor. This will
ultimately cost the state more, as the total reimbursement to chiropractors
per visit is $14.56, and to the others between $21.70 and $53.30, exclusive of
diagnostic tests, which are included in the chiropractic visits.
65
Dynamic Chiropractic, a national chiropractic publication, recently reported
that Wal-Mart, the largest private employer in the world, had without
explanation discontinued chiropractic coverage in its employee health plan.66
"As a longtime insurance official, I have first hand knowledge of how
strained the relationship has been between [DC's] and the insurance
industry," stated PatriciaJackson. 67 She further adds that "[f] or over 30 years,
59 American Chiropractic Ass'n, Inc. v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 151 F. Supp.2d 723 (W.D.Va.
2001).
U .Anti-Quackery Ring at www.http://g//webring.cotv/hub?ring=antiquackerysitc.
61 Chirowatch, at http//www.chirowatch.con/.
62 Quackwatch, at http://www.quackwatch.org/index.html.
63 "Chirobase, at http://www.chirobase.org.
64 Steve Kelly, VGA Files Restraining Order in SuperiorCourtathttp://www.chiroweb.conVarchives/
20i26/09.html
65 Id.
Largest Private U.S. Employer Axes Chiroprattic, DYNAMIC CHIROPRACTIC, Nov. 30,2002, at 1.
67 Patricia Jackson, Doing the Right Thing on Managed Care, at http://www.chiroweb.corVarchives/
20/17/13.html.
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I have witnessed such horrible offenses as not allowing [DC's] into state
peer-review organization buildings to meet with medical staff, and claims
adjusters who rampantly refused to recognize [DC's] as physicians. "68
Time magazine recently ran an article titled " Back off, Chiropractors!"69
with a subheading of "Recent research suggests some chiropractic techniques may be
dangerous for patients. "70
The ICA News reported that at a recent US House of Representatives
Small Business Committee meeting, [m]ember[s] ... slammed Medicare's
chief administrator for the arrogance, meanness and indefensible prejudice
of that agency's operations and policies towards providers in general and
chiropractic in particular."
71
The above are illustrations ofjust ofa few of the many cases of continued
discrimination against chiropractors and the economic injuries suffered as a
result of the AMA conspiracy and illegal boycott.
As a final illustration, the University of Miami Student Health Insurance
Plan does not even categorize chiropractors as physicians as required by
Florida Statute, and not only limits the reimbursement, but categorizes the
treatment by chiropractors as mere physical therapy.7
IV. CHIROPRACTIC BASIS FOR PROTECTION
This leads to the question as to what reason would the insurance
industry have in restricting chiropractic access when the business of
insurance is profitability? Is chiropractic actuarially less cost effective, or is
it effective and any perceived bias just paranoia? These questions are
answered in part by Paul G. Shekelle.73
68 Id.
6 Leon Jaroff, Back Off, Chiropractors! Time, February 27, 2002, at wysiwyg.//1049/http://
www.time.coV...nist/printout/0,8816,213482,00.html.
70 Id.
7 Congressional Committee Slams Medicare For Harassment oProviders; Focuses On Agency's Targeting
Of Chiropractors, at http://www.chiropractic.org/news/mayl6.committee.htm.
72 FLA. STAT. SS 456.039(1) and 627.6482(10) (2002).
73 PAUL G. SHEKELLE, THE USE AND COSTS OF CHIROPRACTIC CARE IN THE HEALTH
INSURANCE EXPERIMENT (1994).
This report presents an analysis of the use and costs of chiropractic services from data that were
collected during the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, which was a randomized
controlled trial of the effect of insurance on the use of health services. The Health Insurance
Experiment was funded by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. This study was
funded in parts by grants from the Agency for Health Care Policy and research and from the
Consortium for Chiropractic Research. Information about the use of chiropractic services, the
effect of cost sharing on the use of chiropractic services, and a comparison of the costs of
chiropractic care and medical care for patients with back pain is presented. This report should
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According to Shekelle "2.4 billion [dollars was] spent on chiropractic in
1988.", 4 Shekelle explains "little research has been done on the use, costs, or
effectiveness of chiropractic care due in part to vigorous opposition by the
Medical Community."7' Shekelle's report goes on to say that "studies show
that the majority of users are middle aged, employed, high school educated,
with low-back pain the most common symptom presented and spinal
manipulation the service most provided." 76 "Chiropractors are the third
most used source of professional help for these symptoms behind general
practitioners and orthopedists, and with twice as many visits."
77
Involving a Worker's Compensation study, Shekelle provides that
"claims information on 396,000 patients from 1988-1990 revealed the average
cost of chiropractic claims for a patient that visited a chiropractor was $411.00
on average and that of a doctor using the same diagnostic code was
significantly higher"
78
In a study of Worker's Compensation in Utah that compared non-
surgical medical care and chiropractic care utilizing the same diagnostic codes
revealed significantly more visits and days of care: the costs, however, were
greater for the medically treated group. In general the overall costs were
greater for the medically treated workers.79
Three studies were performed in Oregon, Florida and Iowa of Worker's
Compensation claims comparing total time lost from work and the total cost
of care. "All [the] studies concluded that [those] treated by chiropractors
had less time lost from work and less total cost of care....,8 0
Other studies have not been able to conclusively show a cost
effectiveness for chiropractic care in Worker's Compensation.
8
'
BC/BS of Arizona conducted a study of their experience with
chiropractic care from 1983-1986. In 79 categories of service, chiropractors
were most expensive in 40%, medical doctors 13%, osteopaths 28%, and
physical therapists 19%. This type analysis is flawed in that it does not
consider coverage limitations that include, per visit service restrictions, in
be of interest to clinicians, health services researchers, and health policy analysts who deal with
back-pain care.
74 Id. at2.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 6.
n Id.
S Id. at7.
7 Paul G. Shekelle, THE USEAND COSTS OF CHIROPRACTIC CARE IN THEHEALTH INSURANCE
EXPERIMENT (1994).
80 Id. at 9.
8 d.
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general service limitations, or whether the service is one more identified with
a particular practitioner.
-82
"[I] ncreasing the insurance restrictions on chiropractic use substantially
decreases the use of chiropractic services. "83
This does not mean, however, that those patients whose insurance
excludes chiropractic care suffer at home alone. They will just go to a
medical doctor and if on average the cost of care is equal, it makes no
difference to the insurance company whether chiropractors are a viable
alternative for their subscribers.
"In summary, the efficacy of spinal manipulation has been demonstrated
for some patients with a single condition, and no others." 4
This refers to that which is scientifically proven, where such research is available.
As further scientific studies are performed additional benefits may be proven.
(emphasis added).,s
The Rand Health Insurance Experiment, a population based randomized
controlled trial, sponsored by the Federal Government, tracked the use of
medical services and health status of enrollees over a three or five-year
period."
86
The Experiment concluded that approximately seven and one-half
percent of the population saw a chiropractor during that time. Chiropractors
delivered the great majority of manipulative care, over 90 percent. Users are
more likely to be white, middle-aged, high school graduated and married.
The four major reasons for seeing a chiropractor were face and neck pain,
headaches and low back pain, and swelling and injury, which comprised 70
percent of the visits.
8 7
The utilization of chiropractic is very sensitive to cost sharing. The
higher the cost to the patient the less they sought chiropractic care. This was
much more so for chiropractors than any other type of provider.88 "In terms
of total cost per episode of care, chiropractors are the second lowest provider
type (bested only by general practitioners). When hospital costs are removed,
chiropractors are the highest cost providers along with orthopedists and
osteopaths. ' 9
f" Id.
83 Id. at 11.
84 Id. at 14.
85 Paul G. Shekelle, THEUSEAND COSTS OF CHIROPRACTIC CARE IN THE HEALTH INSURANCE
EXPERIMENT (1994).
8 Id.
87 Id. at 63-64.
88 Id. at 66.
89 Id. at 67. It must be noted, however, that with chiropractic there is no hospitalization, or
surgery involved and substantially less, if any medication-an obvious benefit.
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Based on the above study it would appear that chiropractic has a neutral
cost effect overall and that at worst should be treated with indifference by
the insurance industry. The cost of similarly effected patients seeing a
general practitioner is overall less costly than specialized chiropractic care.
Without restriction, insurance plans already allow subscribers direct access
to orthopods and osteopaths, the most expensive forms of care. In light of
this information, no logical explanation exists for the current bias towards
chiropractors by insurance providers.
Dr. Walter Wardwell," a noted professor of sociology at the University
of Connecticut, has written extensively on chiropractic and also served on
the U.S. Public Health Services Expert Review Committee that was
established to determine whether chiropractic would be included under
Medicare. While on this committee he observed, "the medically dominated
committee recommended against including [chiropractors.]" 9  Dr.
Wardwell, in his book did an extensive analysis of this type of medical
discrimination and made some illuminating observations.
He made a particularly poignant comment in the Preface of his book that
he "always tended to sympathize with the underdog chiropractors, much as
[he] always sympathize [s] with opposed ethnic groups ....92
That Wardwell, an independent, objective observer should equate the plight
of chiropractors with that of ethnic discrimination is further illustrative of
the problem with the injunction.
Wardwell states that "[b]ecause of differences in licensing laws and
modes of practice, third-party payers are uncertain about what chiropractors
should be reimbursed for. If it is less costly to reimburse chiropractors than
Medical Doctor's, insurance companies should not be reluctant to reimburse
them for almost anything they do."93
"It is ironic.., that chiropractors have won insurance in all states and the
universal right to reimbursement by third party payors, that they have
become subject to many new limitations and restrictions. The most
stringent regulations are those of Medicare .... The insurance companies
often apply these Medicare restrictions in their other health insurance
programs," he added.94 It thus appears that the federal government is the
most egregious perpetrator of discrimination against chiropractors.
% WALTER I. WARDWELL, CHIROPRACTIc: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF A NEW PROFESSION
(1992).
'1 Id. at viii.
9 Id. at ix.
93 Id. at 264.
9 Id. at 266.
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"Possible solutions to this problem would be to change the law so as to
remove that provision and leave state regulations in effect, or to obtain
federal legislation guaranteeing equal access for all licensed practitioners in
all health plans," ' said Wardwell, in referring to ERISA which exempts from
state regulation companies that establish their own employee health plans. 96
Wardwell quotes Keating and Mootz97 who "refer to chiropractors'
realistic paranoia born of nine decades of confrontation with medical
orthodoxy."98 "Such paranoia is pervasive as chiropractors continue to feel
discriminated against by insurance companies unwilling to reimburse them
fairly for their services, and they see the hand of organized medicine
influencing third-party payors, which was one of the AMA's stated goals
from at least 1962. "99
"Chiropractors have been excluded from most policy-making and
advisory boards at the federal level," which helps explain the discriminatory
practices by the federal government. 1°°
Wardwell quotes George McAndrews, the lead counsel for Wilks vAMA,
as saying "quality and patient benefits are not the real issues. The medical
profession reacts like Pavlov's dog to competition. . ... 101
"[T] he AMA... [r] ecognizing that chiropractors clearly are not destined
to become ancillary practitioners ... should consider the ... health of the
American people," urges Wardwell.' °
Wardwell includes in his book actual memos from the AMA to various
interested parties that are of such egregiousness that it is hard to believe that
these are the same doctors that we entrust our health. Below are some
examples.
Four campaign goals were enumerated in a confidential
memorandum summarizing discussion at a "Meeting of a
Committee on Quackery, September 15, 1967" (Trever, 1972, p
123):
Basically, the Committee's short-range objectives for containing the
cult of chiropractic and any additional recognition it might achieve
revolves about four points:
95 Id.
% Walter I. Wardell, Chiropractic: History and Evolution of a New Profession (1992).
97 Joseph Keating and Robert D. Mootz, The Influence of Political Medicine on Chiropractic
Dogmna:Inplicaions For Scientific Development, 12JMPT 12 393-98 (1989).
98 Wardwell, supra note 90, at 267 (quoting Keating and Mootz supra note 97, at 396).
99 Id. (citation omitted).
100 Id. at 269.
lot Id. at 277.
10 Id.
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1. Doing everything within our power to see that chiropractic
coverage under Title 18 of the Medicare Law is not obtained.
2. Doing everything within our power to see the recognition or
listing by the U.S. Office of Education of a chiropractic accrediting
agency is not achieved.
3. To encourage continued separation of the two national
chiropractic associations.
4. To encourage state medical societies to take the initiative in their
state legislatures in regard to legislation that might affect the practice
of chiropractic.
The AMA model plan for state medical societies included
enlisting the aid of outside groups (Trever, 1972, p 123): Other
members of the scientific community and voluntary health
organizations (such as the state cancer society, heart and arthritis
associations) should be encouraged to adopt policy statements on
this subject chiropractic), and to implement informational programs
for their members and the public .... The state's interprofessional
association or health council should involve itself in a public
education program on the subject of quackery, and it should
emphasize the subject of chiropractic.
An interdepartmental Task Force on Chiropractic was
established at the AMA headquarters in Chicago, designed to include
(or influence) its divisions of Law, Communication, Medical
Practice, Health Services, Community Health and Health
Education, Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, Health Care to the
Poor, Council on Legislative Activities, and Liaison Committee to
the American Bar Association .... 103
The Committee also distributed "10,000 pieces of AMA propaganda" to
educators and guidance counselors in order to block the inclusion of a
chiropractic chapter in the Health Careers Guidebook that is distributed to
school guidance counselors by the US Department of Labor."°
The AMA House of Delegates adopted a resolution in 1970 that directed
the medical schools to include specific information in the curricula as to the
health hazard created by the unscientific cult of chiropractic.
10 5
The AMA attack was relentless and pervasive with the booklet,
"Chiropractic: The Unscientific Cult" being sent to every medical doctors
waiting room and the planting of articles that were critical of chiropractic in
103 Id. at 163.
I4 Id.
105 Id 2t 163-64
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Reader's Digest, Consumer Reports, Good Housekeeping, and other widely
read magazines."
The AMA also sponsored the publication of Ralph Lee Smith's bookAt
your Own Risk: The Case Against Chiropractic, mentioned above.'
07
"The AMA anti chiropractic campaign . . . delayed chiropractic
acceptance for many decades [and] it certainly convinced most medical
doctors, many other health providers, and educated lay persons to believe
that chiropractic is an 'unscientific cult.' Ritual condemnation became
routine in medical doctor's offices and in legislative forums."'o,
The only explanation for insurance industry discrimination, therefore,
is that the bias toward chiropractors is a result of the long-standing AMA
opposition to chiropractic, and that it has apparently permeated the insurance
industry. For this reason, state insurance equality laws must be strengthened
and federal preemptions must be eliminated.
V. STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS
The first step would obviously be for the federal government to cease
and desist their discriminatory practices toward chiropractors involving
Medicare, Medicaid, the armed services, and federal employee health plans.
This would require the current government officials and politicians to come
to the same realization that came to the politicians early in the AMA's
history, who saw the antics of organized medicine in relation to the
homeopaths and turned a blind eye to their economically motivated
posturing.
Had the Wilk court been more assertive and forceful with their
injunction, perhaps the government would have taken notice, whether
voluntarily, or by subsequent lawsuits.
The states in an attempt to provide protection to the professions that it
licenses and the citizens that utilize those professionals, in particular
chiropractors, have passed laws to either mandate coverage in insurance plans
and/or provide for equal remuneration for services rendered. On the state
level this partially corrects for the AMA boycott.
One method in which states may regulate such plans is by way of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.1'9The McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed in
tO6 Id. at 174.
"" Id. at 164.
108 Id. at 176.
109 Title 15 U.S.C.A.S 1011. Declaration of policy. 'Congress declares that the continued
regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public
interest, silence on the part of the Congress shall not.
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response to a Supreme Court decision in the previous year, where the court
"held that a fire insurance company which conducted a substantial part of its
business across state lines was engaged in interstate commerce so that its
insurance transactions were subject to federal regulation ....
The states, however, were not granted total control by this Act, but only
to the extent where the state laws and regulations apply to the business of
insurance. Exactly defining the criteria of this business of insurance has
required the attention of the court on all too many occasions. The court in
Metropolitan held that "when interpreting the scope of the McCarran -
Ferguson Act [that] three criteria [are] relevant to determining whether a
particular practice falls within the business of insurance.""' The court listed
the three criteria as "first, whether the practice has the effect of transferring
or spreading a policy holder's risk; second, whether the practice is an integral
part of the policy relationship between one insurer and the insured; and
be constructed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the
several States.
'§ 1012. Regulation by State law; Federal law relating specifically to insurance,
applicability of certain Federal laws afterJune 30, 1948.
'(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject
to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
'(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which
imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of
insurance: Provided, [**8] That after June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended,
known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 191, as amended, known as the Clayton
Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as
amended, shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not
regulated by State law.
'S 1013. Suspension until June 30, 1948, of application of certain Federal laws,
Sherman Anti-Trust Act applicable to agreements to, or acts of, boycott, coercion, or
intimidation.
'(a) Until June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the
Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and
the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, and
the Act ofJune 19, 1936, known as the Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act, shall not
apply to the business of insurance or to acts in the conduct thereof.
'(b) Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said Sherman Act,
inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or
intimidation.
See, e.g.,In re Grand Jury Investigation of the Aviation Insurance Industry, 183 F. Supp. 374, 377
(S.D.N.Y. 1960)
110 Richard Cordero, Annotation: Exemption or Innnunityfroin Federal Antitrust Liability Under
McCarran - Fergnson Act (15 USCA 5 1011-1013) and State Action and Noerr - Pennington Doctrines for
Business of Insurance and Persons Engaged in it, 116 A.L.R. Fed. 163 (1993).
II Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,743 (1985).
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third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance
industry."'2 (Citations omitted)
Application of these principles suggests that mandated-benefit laws are
state regulation of the business of insurance."
3
In keeping with this holding, it would appear that mandated benefit laws
that required that chiropractic care provided by a chiropractor be treated
without discrimination would meet all three criteria and thus those laws
would be considered the business of insurance. But in 1974, came the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)." 4
"(ERISA), comprehensively regulates employer pension and welfare
plans.""' Such plans are defined as those "which provides to employee's
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, PL,93-406, 88 Stat. 829, 29 U.S.C.
Section 1001 et. seq. ERISA comprehensively regulates, amongst other things, employee
welfare benefit plans that, "Through the purchase of insurance or otherwise," provide
medical, surgical, or hospital care, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability or
death § 3(1), 29 USC. § 1002(1).
Congress capped off the massive undertaking of ERISA with three provisions
relating to the pre-emptive effect of the federal legislation.
[1.] The preemption clause:]
"Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section [the saving clause], the
provisions ofthis subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan...." 514.(a),
as set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a).
[2.] The savings clause:]
"Except as provided in subparagraph (B) [the deemer clause], nothing in this
subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which
regulates insurance, banking, or securities." S 514(b)(2)(A), as set forth in 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(2)(A).
[3.] The deemer clause;]
Neither an employee benefit plan ... nor any trust established under such a plan,
shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or
investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of
any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance, insurance contracts, banks, trust
companies, or investment companies." S 514.(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. S 1144.(b)(2)(B).
To summarize the pure mechanics of the provisions quoted above: Ifa state law
"Relate[s] to ... employee benefit plan[s]," it is pre-empted. S514.(a). The saving clause
excepts from the pre-emption clause laws that 'regulat[e] insurance." S 514(b)(2)(A). The
deemer clause makes clear that a state law that "purport[s] to regulate insurance" cannot deem
an employee benefit plan to be an insurance company. § 514 (b)(2)(B) ...
See also Tom Baker and Kyle Logue, Insurance Law and Regulation 193-94, (Spring 2002) (unpublished
manuscript final distribution as a handout by ProfessorJonathon Simon, Insurance Law and Policy, LAW
119A Course Materials University of Miami School of Law).
"1 Metropolitan, 471 U.S. 724 at 732.
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medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits .... Whether these benefits are
provided "through the purchase of insurance or otherwise. " "' The court in
Metropolitan, goes on to explain that "[p1lans may self-insure or they may
purchase insurance for their participants. Plans that purchase insurance - -
so called "insured plans"-are directly affected by state laws that regulate the
insurance industry."'17
However, the court goes on to explain that although "ERISA thus
contains almost no federal regulation of the terms of benefit plans [,] it does,
however, contain a broad pre-emption provision declaring that the statute
shall "supersede any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan."" 8
At this point all would seem lost for state-mandated chiropractic benefits
except for the fact that the ERISA pre-emption "is substantially qualified by
an insurance 'saving clause,' . . . which broadly states that, with one
exception, nothing in ERISA shall be construed to exempt or relieve any
person from any law of any state which regulates insurance, banking, or
securities."' "Thus, state-mandated chiropractic benefits may appear to be
back on track. But, that hope appears to be short-lived, as the court explains
"that the specified exception to the savings clause.., the so-called "deemer
clause," . . . states that no employee-benefit plan... shall be deemed to be
an insurance company or other insurer.., to be engaged in the business of
insurance ... for purposes of any law of any state purporting to regulate
insurance companies .... "120And therein lies the problem with the law as it
relates to state-mandated chiropractic benefits, and the host of other state-
mandated benefits that insureds have grown to require for their health, safety
and welfare.
In order for there to be an outlet for states to undo the effects of the
AMA boycott, the deemer clause of the ERISA Act must be eliminated, or
that chiropractic services be an exception to the deemer clause.The primary
reason for removing the deemer clause is that it allows employers a loophole
whereby they can become self-insured by means of smoke and mirrors.
"Employers often hire health insurance companies to manage the [self-
insured health plan] trust and even purchase 'stop-loss' insurance to protect
the assets of the trust, with the result that, in practice, there is little apparent
difference on a day to day basis between health insurance and an ERISA
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. (quoting section 514(A), 29 U.S.C. Section 1144(A)).
19 Id. at 733.
120 Id.
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trust."12With this readily apparent to even the unsophisticated, it appears that
the courts are just winking at the fraud perpetrated upon the citizenry of each
state, whose laws were meant to provide more for their residents by deeming
those laws to not be saved by federal preemption.
In the absence of congress acting to eliminate the deemer clause, there
appears to be another approach that chiropractors might use to gain access to
the great majority of US citizens that would utilize their services in spite of
the years of baseless negativity espoused by the AMA over the years, if only
their insurance would provide the coverage. Although in Metropolitan, it
appears that general insurance plans not provided by an employer would not
be pre-empted by ERISA, with the vast majority of insureds receiving
insurance through employee plans,' action must be taken if chiropractors
are to be released from the grip of longstanding discrimination.
The other possibility that exists for chiropractors to seek redress from the
effects of the AMA boycott is to pursue additional anti trust litigation at the
state level for those plans such as inJohnson, 23 where the insurance company
conspired with the local medical societies to deny chiropractors
reimbursement for services rendered to the company's subscribers. A case
such as this and the cause of action entailed would carry its own peculiar
legal woes. The McCarran - Ferguson Act again comes into play. If the Act
gives over the regulation of the business of insurance to the states, then it
would seem logical that the Sherman Act, a federal law, would be pre-
empted by the Act. However, the McCarran - Ferguson Act provides that
"[n]othing contained in this chapter shall render the said Sherman Act,
inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of
boycott, coercion, or intimidation." 24
The courts have construed this to mean that in order to be exempt from
the Sherman Act, the conduct in question must not be related to the business
of insurance under McCarran-Ferguson, and where it is the business of
insurance as is the case in Johnson, supra, the conduct must fit under the
exemption to McCarran-Ferguson as it relates to the Sherman Act, where the
conduct takes the form of coercion, intimidation, or boycott. Unfortunately,
conspiracy to monopolize health insurance plans within a state in order to
discriminate against an unfavored mode of treatment or provider is exempt
from the Sherman Act.
125
121 See Baker and Logue, supra note 117, at 199.
1= Id. at 192.
12 Nosser v. Health Care Trust Fund Bd. ofthe City of Shreveport, 666 So. 2d at 1273-75.
124 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 at 743, see supra note 111.
125 Id.; see also supra note 113.
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In order to rectify such a situation, the McCarran-Ferguson Act must be
amended to include conspiracy to the listed exceptions of coercion,
intimidation and boycott, under 15 U.S.C.A. § 1013(b).However, in a case
such as Johnson, supra, where the insurance company acts in concert with a
non-exempt entity such as a local medical society, it forfeits the protection
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act anti-trust exemption and can be tried in
federal court for violation of the Sherman Act.' 26 Had the Wilk court
maintained jurisdiction and extended the injunction to all those 'co-
conspirators' that benefited from and who continue on with the illegal
boycott antics of the AMA to thwart chiropractic and chiropractors, such
illegal conduct might be less rampant. However, that is not the case and in
the absence of insurance companies acting in concert with third parties,
coercion, intimidation, or boycott must be proven to bring an action within
federal jurisdiction, where at least the Wilk seventh circuit court decision
carries some substantial persuasiveness.
With a claim of boycott, the activity must be between two entities
"capable of entering into an agreement or joining in common action in what
would amount.., to a conspiracy, that is a combination of two or more
persons acting in concert to accomplish a common unlawful purpose." 27An
insurance company acting to unlawfully discriminate against chiropractic
could not be brought to answer under the Sherman Act by exemption of
McCarran-Ferguson, since it would be considered acting internally and not
in concert.
Coercion and intimidation, however, can involve a single person or
entity not liable under § 1 of the Sherman Act, that might be liable under § 2
as conducting unlawful practices that constitute either an abuse of monopoly
power or an attempt to monopolize.1 28 However, the courts to date have
predicated coercion and intimidation on whether the acts constitute a
boycott.1 9 Where the activity is internal as we have seen, no boycott is
possible. Thus the exception to the McCarran-Ferguson Acts exemption to
anti-trust violations is negated, leading us back to ground zero, requiring that
conspiracy be added to the exceptions and in addition that the definition of
boycott include single entities with substantial market power and share fall
126 Id.
1-1 Id.
128 Id.
19 "The McCarran-Ferguson Act does not prohibit coercion and intimidation in and of itself, but
only such coercion and intimidation that would constitute an agreement or act of boycott." Hopping v
Standard Life Ins. Co., No. GC81-167-LS-P, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13781 at *28 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 14,
1983).
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under the category of those that can be held to have created an unlawful
boycott.
VI. CONCLUSION
The one thing that could have changed the history of the post Wilk
injunction would have been the Supreme Court accepting certiorari on
appeal from the AMA. Had the court done so, then the precedent set
nationwide would have sent a clear message and carried much greater weight
with the judiciary, congress, the executive, the states, and with the general
public. Failure for the Supreme Court to accept jurisdiction has been the
second most devastating event for chiropractic next to the AMA's illegal
boycott and conspiracy.
Based on all the evidence gathered of the continued ill effects of the
AMA's illegal boycott and conspiracy, it is clear that the Wilk injunction has
had little to no effect on the unimpeded growth of chiropractic, nor has it
provided any meaningful remedy for the cancer of discrimination that the
AMA has spread to the reputation of chiropractic.
The lack of foresight by the Supreme Court has only created the
necessity for increased litigation lacking precedential guidance. The foot
dragging by the executive and legislative branches of the federal government
has allowed the ill effects of the AMA's illegal boycott and conspiracy to
continue to the detriment of chiropractic and ultimately the health, safety,
and welfare of the citizens of the United States. With a healthcare system
dominated by organized medicine that is failing a great many Americans,
time is of the essence for the government to open their ears to alternatives
and to realize that "monopoly [is] doubtless the intent of [organized
medicine's] program,"3 " and not the welfare of this country.
130 See supra note 11.
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